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Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is one of the technological applications of
quantum mechanics. The technology allows two users to securely establish
an unbreakable key. The key is used to encrypt and decrypt sensitive infor-
mation such as online banking and emails. This technological application has
matured in an industry as it provides real world implementation. It offers
a provably secure key based on the principles of quantum mechanics. There
are products that are available that can be used to implement this technology.
This study demonstrates the implementation of the QKD process for the
undergraduate physics curriculum. We outline the procedure of QKD in
a convenient way for students to follow and understand. To this end, a
comprehensive manual has been developed to enable undergraduate students
to learn the foundations of QKD. Students will gain knowledge that using
quantum mechanical properties, two remote parties can securely establish a
communication by exchanging keys which can then be used as an encryption.
We present the QKD system such as the id 3000 as a learning tool in the
physics 3rd-year laboratory, to introduce undergraduate students to applica-
tions in quantum information science. We demonstrate a typical experiment
which undergraduate students can perform using the id 3000 system in the
3rd physics laboratory. Our vision is to see students exploring quantum me-
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Quantum mechanics is a branch of physics that deals with the mathematical
laws that govern the microscopic properties of physical objects [1]. Quantum
mechanics showed that light with other forms of electromagnetic radiation
comes in small particles known as photons. The photons energy, spectral
intensity and colours can also be determined by the laws of quantum me-
chanics. Physicists at the end of 19th century were certain that most of the
fundamental physical principles had been demonstrated and proved accurate.
They expected very few improvement to obtain an extra decimal place of ac-
curacy. Thus, the discovery of quantum mechanics and Einstein’s discovery
of relativity transmogrify the field of physics in the early 20th century [2].
1
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The development of quantum mechanics was initially motivated by two sci-
entific hypotheses which demonstrated the inadequacy of classical physics.
These are the ultraviolet catastrophe [3] and the photoelectric effect [4, 5, 6].
Max Planck in 1900 put up a mathematical model that demonstrated the
thermal radiation was at equilibrium with a set of harmonic oscillators, a
theory that was used to describe the properties of black body radiation [7].
Thereafter, Albert Einstein in 1905 elaborated the photoelectric effect by
postulating that a beam of light is a stream of particles known as quanta or
photons that possessed an energy that equals the product of its frequency
and a numerical constant called the Planck constant [8]. This led to some
major discoveries into the understanding of how physical objects behave at
the microscopic level: Wave-particle duality where light propagates as wave
and in some respects like particles [9, 10, 11, 12] and the Uncertainty Prin-
ciple [13].
In quantum mechanics, the Uncertainty Principle can be easily described
as the more closely one determines one measurement (for instance the posi-
tion of a particle), the less precise another measurement relating to the same
particle (momentum) must become. The wave-particle duality theory was
first demonstrated in a double slit experiment in 1827 by Augustine Fresnel
[14] and was later observed in the Stern-Gerlach in 1922 [15]. The Stern-
Gerlach experiment shows many important aspects of quantum mechanics:
2
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the aspect of the natural world has been shown to be quantised, and only
able to take certain discrete values, quantum mechanics is probabilistic [16].
In 1925 Erwin Schrödinger constructed the mathematical equation that elab-
orates the behaviour of a quantum mechanical wave [17]. The Schrödinger’s
construct (equation) is important to quantum mechanics. The equation pro-
vides an allowable constant state of a quantum system and details how the
quantum state of a physical system change in time.
To date, based on some of these theories of quantum mechanics, many
technological applications have been developed [18, 19]. The applications
of quantum mechanics are numerous, but we will only mention one that is
the focus of this work. Using the laws of quantum mechanics, a secure key
can be generated. A term now known as Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)
[20, 21, 22, 23].
Quantum Key Distribution is a process or a scheme that enables two distant
parties named Alice (transmitter) and Bob (receiver) to transfer a secure
random key. The secure key is then used to encrypt or decrypt confidential
communication taking place over the Internet such as online banking and
emails. Physical processes are utilised to transfer information using a quan-
tum carrier in the form of single photons through a quantum channel. Such
a channel can be either fibre optics or free-space. The security of QKD is
based on the general the principles of quantum mechanics which are invul-
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nerable to mathematical algorithms [24] and increases computational power
[13, 25, 26, 15]. QKD effectively addresses the challenges confronting clas-
sic key distribution approaches, by offering a provably secure cryptographic
building block for remote parties to generate cryptographic keys. Quantum
Key Distribution can be performed by various protocols. The fundamental
protocol is known as the BB84-Bennett and Brassard 1984 [20, 27]. There are
products available which can be used to perform this protocol, for example,
the id 3000 system [28].
1.2 The objective of this study
This study demonstrates the implementation of the QKD process for the
undergraduate physics curriculum. We describe QKD in steps which can be
easily followed by the undergraduates students. As a result, a comprehensive
manual has been developed. The manual enables undergraduate students to
learn the foundations of QKD. The undergraduate curriculum for quantum
mechanics course covers subjects such as the wave function, observables, op-
erators and the Uncertainty Principle. For students to be able to follow and
understand the process of QKD, they also require an understanding of a
quantum bit (qubit), quantum states, quantum measurement, interferome-
ters and no-cloning theorem. We present the id 3000 system as a learning
tool in the 3rd year physics laboratory, to introduce undergraduate students
to applications in quantum information science. We demonstrate a typical
4
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experiment the undergraduate students can perform in the physics laboratory
using the id 3000 system. The study ensures that students gain knowledge
of QKD by learning how to implement a QKD protocol and further gain
exposure to QKD systems.
1.3 The structure of this study
This study is organised as follows: In Chapter One we give an overview of
QKD. In Chapter Two we discuss the fundamental concepts and formalism of
quantum mechanics needed for a proper understanding of this technological
application. Chapter Three provides the description of QKD and details the
steps including the devices required for a successful implementation of QKD.
In Chapter Four we present the id 3000 QKD system as a learning tool to
improve students understanding of QKD. In Chapter Five we provide meth-
ods for utilising the id 3000 system. We then describe a typical experiment
that undergraduate students can perform followed analysis and discussion of




Basics building blocks of QKD
The basic element that provides a mathematical structure in which to un-
derstand QKD is known as a quantum state. To any isolated quantum state
in quantum mechanics there exists a complex vector space called state space
(Hilbert space) [29]. The system can be entirely described by it state vec-
tor which is a unit vector in the Hilbert space. In quantum mechanics, a
quantum state (state vector) is written as |ψ〉x, with inner product given as,
〈ψ|ψ〉, (2.1)
where |ψ〉 is called the ket and denotes as the transpose of the complex
conjugate of 〈ψ| and called the bra. The time evolution of a given closed
quantum mechanical system is easily depicted by the Schrödinger model or
6
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where H, is the Hamiltonian and ~ is given by h
2π
where h is the Planck’s
constant. Thus, the time evolution of a constant quantum state is given as,
|ψ′〉 = U|ψ〉, (2.3)
where U , is a unitary operator. Alternatively, a quantum state can be intro-





where the coefficients Pj are non-negative and add up to one. The next
section deals with one of the simplest quantum mechanical systems called a
qubit.
2.1 A qubit
A qubit or more accurately a quantum bit is a unit of quantum information.
It is the quantum version corresponding to a classical bit that can be used
for communication [18]. A classical bit has a state of either 0 or 1, however
a qubit is defined as a two level system |0〉 and |1〉. The difference between
7
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Figure 2.1: The schematic diagram known as the Bloch sphere, shows a
qubit, the two level system with state |0〉 and |1〉 [18].
the classical bit and qubit is that a qubit can exist in a super-position (that
is, the linear combination) given as,
|ψ〉 = α|0〉+ β|1〉, (2.5)
where alpha (α) and beta (β) provide the probability amplitudes of the
quantum system. The normalisation amplitude is equivalent to the abso-
lute square that α and β and is given as:
|α|2 + |β|2 = 1. (2.6)
The structure that perfectly represents a qubit is called the Bloch sphere
[18]. In the Bloch sphere, states are presented as unit vectors with three
8
Chapter 2. Basics building blocks of QKD
dimensions x, y and z as given in Figure 2.1.
A qubit in a super-position behaves according to a principle which states
that: A qubit may be in a number of states simultaneously such as |ψ〉 =
α|0〉 + β|1〉 until observed at which point the super-position collapses down
to a single state [30]. This means the probability for a linear system (qubit)
to collapse to a state |0〉 is normalised to |α|2 and for a state |1〉 is normilised
to |β|2. A qubit can also be represented by polarising light. The next section
discusses polarisation.
2.1.1 Polarisation of light
Students are familiar with light as an electromagnetic wave in a classical
manner. In quantum mechanics, they meet the particle nature of light and
the concept of single photons [5, 15]. The property of an electromagnetic wave
is the polarisation. The direction of light in which single photons propagate
can be positioned into polarisation components namely: horizontal state |H〉
(00), vertical |V 〉 (900) and in diagonal (|−〉 and |+〉) which corresponds to
(−450 and 450). This can be achieved using a polarisation filter. A filter, can
polarise light in a sense that is parallel to the filter axis [31]. For example, a
qubit that is in superposition illustrated in equation (2.5) has |α|2 probability
to be transmitted in the vertical direction. [31].
9
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Example 1
Figure 2.2: In the schematic an incident light is projected through a
polariser set at 450 which is diagonal state. As illustrated the outcome of
the light provides a diagonal 450 linearly polarised state |+〉.
Suppose we have a light with single photons propagating through a polari-
sation filter that is set at an angle of 450. The single photons which will be
transmitted are the ones parallel to the polarisation axis, the other light will
be blocked. The illustration of a linearly polarised light is shown in Figure
2.2.
10
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Example 2
Figure 2.3: The incident light pass through a polarisation filter set at 900, a
linearly polarised vertical 900 light is produced which gives a |V 〉 state.
When a polarisation filter axis is set at 900, single photons oscillate in the
direction of a polarising filter which is the vertical direction, as illustrated in
Figure 2.3.
Example 3
The polarisation filter set at −450 transmits a linearly polarised state parallel
to the filter axis as presented in Figure 2.4.
Example 4
In the cases where a filter is set to transmit horizontal state |H〉 at 00. It
produces a state parallel to filter axis, as illustrated in Figure 2.5
11
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Figure 2.4: A incident light coming to pass through a polariser set at
diagonal −450, as it illustrated in the diagram a linearly polarised diagonal
−450 light is produced and it gives a state that is diagonal |−〉 state.
Figure 2.5: The incoming incident light passes through a polariser set at 00,
then a linearly polarised horizontal and it gives a |H〉 state.
These linearly polarised states where it comes to measurements, can be mea-
12
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sured in the rectilinear linear basis and diagonal basis. The rectilinear basis
is formed by vertical (900) and horizontal (00) polarisation. The diagonal
basis is formed by 450 and -450, as shown in Figure 2.6. These measurements
could be sometimes be affected by a phase. For example, relative phase. This
shall be discussed in the next section
Figure 2.6: The representation a linearly polarised light where a quantum
state (qubit) is measured in the rectilinear base and diagonal base [32].
2.1.2 Phase
Phase can be classified into two major types, the global and relative phase.
For example, eiθ |ψ〉, where eiθ is the global phase factor for which |ψ〉 is
a real number. During measurement, however, the global phase factor can
be ignored, but the relative phase manifests itself. The relative phase is
the waveform obtained at a constant frequency (sine wave). In practice, a
relative phase shift can be determined with the use of the Mach-Zehnder
interferometer [33]. A Mach-Zehnder interferometer is a highly configurable
and very flexible interferometer used to demonstrate interference of single
photons which is one of the examples of superposition principle [33]. The
Mach-Zehnder interferometer is sketched in Figure 2.7. Single photons that
13
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Figure 2.7: The schematic of the Mach-Zehnder interferometer, another
example for superposition principle ( single photon interference ) [34].
are emitted from the laser diode (LD) are split at the first beam splitter (BS1)
into two arms or axes: Transmission and Reflection [35]. The single photons
in the Transmission and Reflection axis get recombined at the second beam
splitter (BS2). The output of BS2 is then measured by either, detectors
known as Avalanche Photo-Diode (APD1) or (APD2). The reflection axis
carries a relative phase of π
2
. In the Mach-Zehnder interferometer, the path
length of the axes (Transmission and Reflection) must be equal in order
to clearly see the interference of single photon. The visibility of the single
photon interference decreases as the path length differs.
2.2 Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle
In general, the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle states that: the more closely
one determines one measurement (for instance the position of a particle), the
14
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less precise another measurement relating to the same particle (momentum)
must become. This explains that one cannot measure the qubit propagating
without disturbing the process [36, 37]. For example, if one performs some
measurement on the qubit without knowing the position of the state, such a
measurement yields an ambiguity (perturbation) in the state. Perturbation
means a state is disturbed and has changed to another state which is different
to what it was before. This principle around quantum mechanics application
makes it possible to achieve things which cannot be done in the classical
physics.
2.3 No-cloning theorem
Cloning means making a copy. For example a qubit |0〉 being transformed to
a state |00〉, the same can be done with state |1〉 to a state |11〉. In quantum
mechanics, it is impossible to make such transformation (perfect copy) of an
unknown state with perfect accuracy. This is called the no-cloning theorem
[38]. The no-cloning theorem forms an important property in the security of
QKD. The theorem prevents an eavesdropper from tempering the commu-
nication channel and making copies of the transmitted quantum state. We
shall see in the next chapter how this can be achieved.
These basic concepts and formalism of quantum mechanical properties are
useful in today’s technology application such as QKD. They are used to
15
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achieve a safe transmission between the remote parties. With this informa-




Quantum Key Distribution is a process that utilises properties of quantum
mechanics to enable two distant parties named Alice and Bob to randomly
generate and exchange a secure cryptographic key [20]. The goal of QKD is
for two remote parties to exchange a secure key which can then be used to
encrypt and decrypt information. The description of QKD is illustrated in
Figure 3.1. The communication is implemented by applying a protocol to
encode information in single photons as qubits. This encoded information is
exchanged between Alice and Bob across a quantum channel.
The transmission of single photons (qubits) is protected by the Heisenberg
Uncertainty Principle and the no-cloning theorem. Any unauthorised eaves-
dropper, Eve, who might try to extract the qubits in the quantum channel
will be revealed, as this will disturb the state. The unique property of QKD
17
Chapter 3. Quantum Key Distribution
Figure 3.1: The illustration of a QKD scheme, where Alice is the
transmitter and Bob is the receiver. The information Alice is transmitting
is carried by a state and is sent to Bob.
is that Alice and Bob have the ability to detect eavesdropping. The second
channel within the QKD scheme represented in Figure 3.1 is the classical
channel which is used to detect the eavesdropping that might have occurred
during the key exchange process, this process shall be more detailed in sec-
tion 3.2.2. A QKD system is achieved with the use of special hardware such
as a single photon source, a phase modulator, detectors and a quantum ran-
dom number generator.
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3.1 Devices to build a QKD system
3.1.1 A single photon source
Figure 3.2: The schematic of a single photon source known as laser [39].
A single photon source is a device that emits single photon at a time. The
most common source used to perform this task is called an attenuated laser.
The attenuated laser weakens a strong light beam to produce a single photon
at a given time. An ideal single photon source produces single photon states
with 100 % probability. In a QKD system, attenuated lasers are the most
important devices, as they generate single photon per light pulse to encode
the information. A schematic of a laser source is sketched in Figure 3.2.
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3.1.2 A Phase Modulator
Figure 3.3: A schematic of a Phase Modulator utilised in a QKD system
[40].
A phase modulator (PM) is an optical modulator designed to control the
phase of single photons by keeping the amplitude of the signal constant as
illustrated in Figure 3.3 [40]. Within a QKD system, the PM carries out the
phase (pulses) of all single photons emitted from the source. It then maintains
the phase such that a constant amplitude is obtained. The modulation of
pulses is performed by setting the frequency which can be efficient for pulse
emission. This type of optical modulator can also be employed to switch
between different phases often called phase shift. It is classified as a tool
which can be used for processing information.
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3.1.3 A detector
Figure 3.4: Is the image of detector known as the APD used in QKD
systems [27].
A detector in QKD systems can be required to count the transmitted single
photons and release signal as the output. There exist major counting detec-
tors designed to perform this task, with the Avalanche Photo-diodes (APD)
being the most widely used for implementation of QKD [27]. The APD is
designed to operate within the wavelength ranges from (900 - 1700 nm).
This range makes it possible for an APD to give efficient detection (correct)
counts and can easily control dark counts (noise). The APD have a break
down voltage ranging from (20 - 40 V). Such low voltages have a potential
for providing high and visible single photon detection. The timing detection
event of single photons in an APD is achieved up to 100 MHz frequency. We
have shown the image of an APD in Figure 3.4.
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3.1.4 A Quantum Random Number Generator
Figure 3.5: Schematic of a Quantum Random Number Generator (QRNG)
[41].
A Quantum Random Number Generator (QRNG) is a device which can be
utilised to generate a bit sequence based on the probabilistic nature of quan-
tum mechanics [41]. QRNG exploits elementary quantum optical processes
as a source of pure randomness. Using quantum mechanical properties, single
photons are emitted from a laser and sent through an optical element known
as a beam splitter [41]. The light pulses are split into two equal proportion,
reflection or transmission. The reflection and transmission light pulses are
detected to produce a 0 or 1 as is illustrated in Figure 3.5. Such quantum
processes provide instantaneous and true entropy. In a QKD system, this
type of a QRNG is exploited to randomly choose the encoding of the bits.
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3.2 The steps to produce a secure key
In a QKD system, a secure key (cryptographic key) is produced using quan-
tum mechanical properties together with the devices and channels. The
channels are namely: a quantum channel and a classical channel, which play
a major role in producing a secure key. There exist steps which need to be
followed using these channels in a QKD system.
3.2.1 A quantum channel
A quantum channel is a medium in which single photons are transmitted
[42]. A quantum channel is of two forms: memoryless (noisy) and memory
(noiseless). A memoryless quantum channel is a type in which single photons
flow from the system to the environment whereas a memory quantum chan-
nel is one where single photons flow from the environment to the system as
shown in Figure 3.6 [43]. In a QKD system, a noisy channel is of particular
interest. This is because it has an ability to highlight any eavesdropping.
Figure 3.6: The illustration of a quantum channel applicable for the
implementation of QKD [42].
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The quantum noisy channel can be either free-space or fibre optics. Free-
space is a medium that involves the atmosphere (air). Fibre is a medium
that implements fibre optics cable to guide single photons from point-to-
point. The purpose of these quantum channels in a QKD system is to allow
the distribution of single photons to be transferred from Alice to Bob. The
distribution of single photons contains the information used by Bob to pro-
duce the raw key.
3.2.2 A classical channel
A classical channel is generally known as a public channel which takes place
over the Internet. In QKD systems, this particular type of channel is used
to authenticate a distributed key. Authentication is known as key distilla-
tion, it is the process of addressing errors which may have occurred during
the transmission [44]. The implementation of QKD is bound to have these
errors. This is due to the imperfection of equipment and disturbance over
the quantum channel which can be referred to as noise. Alice and Bob ad-
dress all the errors by performing post-processing which involves sifting, error
estimation, error correction and privacy amplification.
Sifting
A sifting process is a step Alice and Bob perform after exchanging single
photons. In this step, Bob discusses the measurement he has used for every
single photon received. Alice compares Bob’s measurements with the single
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photons polarisation sequence for the transmission. If there exists some com-
patibility in the basis used to prepare and measure the single photon, they
keep that bit otherwise the bits of incompatible bases are discarded. This
procedure results in the generation of the sifted key.
Error estimation
The error estimation process is a step Alice and Bob perform after obtaining
the sifted key. In this step, Alice and Bob find the errors committed during
the transmission. Once they have obtained the errors, Alice and Bob apply
an algorithm such as the Cascade algorithm [45]. This algorithm allows Alice
and Bob to test the small portion of the bits in the sifted key. All the errors
are attributed to eavesdropping in the sifted key [27]. The small string tested
can be removed and the remaining sifted key is used to perform the error
correction.
Error correction
The error correction process is a step Alice and Bob can perform if they have
observed errors in the sifted key. The performance of error correction can be
applied to the remaining sifted key in which they use an algorithm called the
hash function [22]. The algorithm assists in correcting all the errors in the
the sifted key. Once this step is achieved, the last step towards a final key is
privacy amplification.
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Privacy amplification
The privacy amplification process is a step Alice and Bob perform to produce
a secure key. Alice and Bob carry out privacy amplification on the corrected
sifted key. The privacy amplification comes with a high probability of making
sure that all the errors (Eve gaining information) are eliminated in the key
[46]. This process applies a universal hash function algorithm to eliminate
whatever information Eve might have gained [46, 47]. Hence, a secure key is
produced. Figure 3.7 gives the summary of all the steps that are followed in
a QKD system to produce a secure key.
Figure 3.7: The generation a secret key in a QKD system can be
summarised by this diagram [28].
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3.3 Methods of encoding information
Encoding information can be performed by various methods in QKD systems.
The simplest method can be done using either polarisation or the phase ap-
proach. These two approaches can be implemented using the BB84 (Bennett
and Brassard 1984), SARG04 (Scarani, Antonio, Ribordy and Gisin (2004))
and B92 (Bennett 1992) protocols.
3.3.1 BB84 Protocol
BB84 protocol was invented by Bennett and Brassard in 1984. The protocol is
a prepare and measure scheme which employs four quantum states to encode
information [20]. The encoding procedures of this protocol shall follow.
Polarisation encoding BB84
A BB84 protocol is implemented using four quantum states based on the
pulses of light that contain single photons polarised in vertical, horizontal,
+450 and −450 direction. This operation forms two sets of polarisation bases,
namely rectilinear (vertical and horizontal polarisation) and diagonal (+450
and −450 polarisation) bases [20, 22]. Alice performs transmission by en-
coding qubit into single photons through polarisation. For example, bit 0
corresponds to a horizontal (00) polarised state, bit 1 to a vertical (900), bit
0 to a diagonal (−450) and bit 1 to a diagonal (450) state. This method is
sketched in Figure 3.8. Using a quantum channel, for example, free-space,
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Figure 3.8: Polarisation encoding for a BB84 protocol. Alice encodes the
information in the four polarisation states as illustrated in the diagram and
Bob measure the polarised single photon using two bases in his location [48].
Alice transmit a string of bits to Bob. For each bit of information, Alice
randomly chooses the polarisation state of a single photon. Bob randomly
choose a polarisation basis to measure the single photons received. This pro-
cedure results in the generation of the raw key.
Using a classical channel, for example, the Internet, Bob discusses the mea-
surement bases he has chosen for every single photon received. Alice com-
pares Bob’s measurement with the single photons polarisation sequence that
she has implemented for the transmission. If there is compatibility in the
base they keep the bit and discard unrelated bases. The compatible bits
form a sifted key which then undergoes error estimation, error correction
and privacy amplification. Traditionally, these steps result in a secure key.
In Table 3.1, we show how the distribution of single photons is accomplished
between Alice and Bob.
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Table 3.1: The measurements for a polarisation encoding method in BB84
protocol
Alice’s bit 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
Single photon polarisation ↗ ↑ −→ ↖ −→ ↗ ↖ −→ ↗ ↖ ↑
Bob Bases
⊕ ⊕ ⊗ ⊗ ⊕ ⊗ ⊕ ⊗ ⊗ ⊕ ⊕
Bob detection 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1
Public discussion N Y N Y Y Y N Y N Y Y
sifted key - 1 - 0 0 1 - - 1 - 1
Phase encoding BB84
Phase encoding is a method applied using the Mach-Zehnder interferometer
[35]. Alice and Bob are separated by a few kilometres. Using an interfer-
ometer, maintaining the path length of the two axes can be difficult due to
environmental factors. A way to resolve this issue is to apply two different
(unbalanced) interferometers. This approach allows the first interferometer
to control the single photons picked by the short arm in Alice’s interferom-
eter and Bob’s interferometer. The second interferometer controls the single
photons that taken the long path. Figure 3.9 provides the method of phase
encoding applied using BB84 protocol.
The key distribution process is possible using states encoded in four possible
phase shifts [35]. Alice generates the bits by applying four possible phases
such as 0, π
2
for bit 0 and π, 3π
2
for bit 1 through the interferometer. For
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Figure 3.9: The schematic diagram showing phase encoding method for a
BB84 protocol, where Alice randomly performs the encoding in the four
possible phase shift given in the first Mach-Zehnder. The receiver Bob then
perform the measurement using a phase shift shown in the second
Mach-Zehnder interferometer [33].
each single photon pulse Alice is transmitting, a phase modulator is applied
to randomly shift the pulse to any of the four choices 0, π
2
, π and 3π
2
. Bob




During this process, Bob randomly chooses a basis by performing a 0 or π
2
phase shift. If there exist interference single photons (super-position), de-
tector (D1) triggers and detector (D2) triggers in the pluses with a phase of
π
2
. These detectors D1 and D2 are registered as bit 0 and bit 1 respectively.
The two parties discuss their phase measurements. They match the phase
difference (ΦA - ΦB), in situations where phase difference observed as 0 or π.
This indicates compatible bits which results in a distribution of a raw key.
Table 3.2 gives the summary of this encoding method.
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Table 3.2: Summary of the key exchange when phase encoding is
performed based on the BB84 protocol
Bit Value φA φB (φA − φB) Bit value
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3.3.2 SARG04 Protocol
SARG04 protocol was introduced by Scarani, Antonio, Ribody and Gisin in
2004 (SARG04) [49]. The protocol is an improved version of the well known
BB84 and was developed with the purpose of strengthening the security of
QKD [50]. This protocol is resistant to Photon-Number Splitting (PNS) at-
tacks that takes place when an attenuated laser is used which may emits
more than one photon per pulse. SARG04 protocol further allows the imple-
mentation of QKD to still function over connections with high losses (noise).
In particular SARG04 protocol can achieve high secret key rate at longer
distances than BB84.
The procedure of the SARG04 protocol is the same as the BB84 for the
transmission of single photons (qubit) in the quantum channel, however, dif-
fers in the step where Alice and Bob utilises the classical channel. Using a
classical channel, Alice does not reveal the basis of her encoding, however,
she reveal a pair of non-orthogonal states she has used. Bob performs mea-
surement in one of the orthogonal states provided by Alice. If Bob used the
correct basis, he will measure the correct state. This process leads to Alice
and Bob sharing compatible bits. This protocol is implemented within the
id 3000 QKD system and will be further discussed in Section 5.2.
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3.3.3 B92 Protocol
B92 Protocol was defined by Bennett in 1992. The implementation of the
B92 protocol involves two quantum states shall be detailed below [21].
Polarisation encoding B92
A secure key distribution is successful using a two quantum state based on
pulses of light that contain single photons with polarised state along with 45◦
and 90◦ respectively. In this protocol, Alice and Bob first make an agreement
through classical channel (Internet) on how to perform the encoding. The
two participants agree that Alice will transmit single photons to Bob using
two non-orthogonal polarisations such as 450 for diagonal linearly polarised
state and 900 for a vertical linearly polarised state. These preparations of
Alice corresponds to bit 1 and 0 respectively. Bob on the other side uses two
non-orthogonal polarisation state in the diagonal direction of −450 for bit 0
and horizontal direction 00 for bit 1. These polarisation states are orthogo-
nal to one of Alice. The scheme is shown in Figure 3.10. Using a quantum
channel, free space. Alice randomly encodes bit 0 or 1 by polarising single
photons according to the rule. The linearly polarised light (single photons) is
then transmitted to Bob. When Bob receives light (single photons), he per-
forms measurements and detection using a polarisation analyser and a single
photon detector. If Bob analyses a single photon for example, along 00, he
will infer that it was sent in a diagonal direction hence Alice sent a single
photon with 450 polariser. Bob will register detections of a bit 1 through 00
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Figure 3.10: Polarisation encoding for a B92 protocol Alice perform the
encoding by randomly polarising light either vertical (900) or diagonal(450)
to encode 0 or 1 respectively. Bob perform measurements in the incoming
single photons by applying polarisation filter in one of two directions
orthogonal to Alice polarisations which are horizontal 0◦ or diagonal −45◦
to measure 1 or 0 respectively. [51].
and bit 0 through 450.
The two participants utilise the Internet as a classical channel. Alice and
Bob acquire a sifted key without revealing the polariser used for each mea-
surement. Alice and Bob keep only the detection results which then form a
key called the sifted key. The measurements for the B92 protocol is presented
in Table 3.3.
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Table 3.3: The measurements for a polarisation encoding method in B92
protocol
Alice’s bit 1 0 1 0 1 0
Single photon polarisation ↗ ↑ ↗ ↑ ↗ ↑
Bob’s polarisation ↖ −→ −→ ↖ −→ ↖
Bob’s measurement 0 1 1 0 1 0
Bob’s result N N Y Y Y Y
sifted key - - 1 0 1 0
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Phase encoding B92
A phase encoding method for B92 protocol is also implemented with two
Mach-Zehnder interferometers [35]. The first interferometer belongs to Alice
and the second interferometer belongs to Bob as presented in Figure 3.11.
The key exchange process between Alice and Bob for this method is achieved
using two quantum states encoded in two possible phase shifts in the first
interferometer [35]. Alice generates the bits by applying two possible phase
shifts of 0 for bit 0 and π
2
for bit 1 in the interferometer. Bob measures the




for a bit 0.
Figure 3.11: Phase encoding for B92 protocol, as provided in the diagram
Alice perform two choices of phase shift to encode the bit using the first
Mach-Zehnder interferometer. Bob apply phase shift shown in the second
Mach-Zehnder to measure the incoming single photons pulses [33].
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3.4 Eavesdropping within a quantum channel
There is a probability for Eve to perform attacks in the quantum channel.
There exist many ways Eve may try to gain information in a QKD system.
The common attacks Eve can use are known as intercept-resend [52] and
faked state attack. This work will discuss the intercept-resend attack.The
intercept-resend strategy is when Eve aims at obtaining the information with-
out being detected. This attack can be performed either in polarisation or
phase encoding.
3.4.1 Polarisation encoding with Eve
The single photons Alice sends can be blocked by Eve. This strategy allows
Eve to prepare and send new single photons to Bob as shown in Figure 3.12.
This will lead to an error in the transmission line. During this process, there
is a 50 % probability to obtain an exact measurement base of the single
photons, in cases where Eve used the wrong base to measure. There is also
a 50 % probability Eve’s measurement could be correct. This means that,
there is 25 % probability for single photons successfully measured by Eve to
produce an error in the key. They match transmitted bits, over a classical
channel to check if the bits were eavesdropped. Since QKD is bound by the
laws of quantum mechanics, any attacks made by Eve will lead to errors
or disturbances in the transmission which will be detected and removed.
Therefore this type of attack can be detected [53].
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Figure 3.12: Polarisation encoding with Eve in the middle shows Eve
extracting states in the quantum channel and it being sent to Bob as a new
single photon state [53].
3.4.2 Phase encoding with Eve
A phase encoding method can be eavesdropped by loopholes in the interfer-
ometer [54, 55]. This attack is called phase mapping. Eve re-maps Alice’s
phase shift as demonstrated in Figure 3.13, by transmitting single photon
pulses which transmit through the quantum channel towards Bob’s location.




with 0, µ, 2µ, 3µ [55]. However, since Eve
can manipulate the phase shift, this means, she can also intercept the phase
difference by implementing an intercept-resend attack without remapping the
phase. This attack will lead to an error rate of 25 % which will be observed
by Alice and Bob. Such high error rate leads to a discarding of information
between Alice and Bob. A tolerable error rate for a BB84 protocol is up to
11 %.
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Figure 3.13: Schematic diagram of phase-mapping attack for a BB84
protocol. Eve in this attack tries to re-map phase shifts used by Alice and




QKD system as a learning tool
Figure 4.1: The QKD system id 3000 provides two system, Alice and Bob.
Today various platforms have been developed for QKD. A product such as
the id 3000 system is available in the market. These systems are designed
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based on the phase encoding method to perform QKD. Here we present the
id 3000 system as a learning tool. The id 3000 system is a fibre based system
developed by IDquantique in Switzerland in the year 2005. The system is
designed to implement QKD up to 100 km. It works as an auto-compensating
device, which is stable and requires no alignment. It is very easy to utilise and
is operated through the use of software specifically written by IDquantique
[56]. The system is developed to generate and share random secure keys
between two remote parties. The id 3000 system is designed to support
the phase encoding of a BB84 and SARG protocol. The key component of
id 3000 system is the interface which allows participants to electronically
record experimental data. The interface comprises of Alice’s system and
Bob’s system which is controlled via two computers and employs fibre optics
as a quantum channel to link the two users. The id 3000 system is presented
in Figure 4.1, Alice is the transmitter and Bob is the receiver.
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4.1 Alice’s system
Figure 4.2: The image present Alice’s system, inside the box there is a 12
km fibre roll planted in the system and electronic devices next to a fibre roll.
Alice’s system consists of the optical and electronic components as shown
if Figure 4.2. The optical components are responsible for performing the
transfer of single photons to Bob’s system. The electronic components pro-
vide high-level operation in monitoring the available devices in the system.
The entire scheme of Alice’s system will be discussed later in the chapter.
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4.2 Bob’s system
Figure 4.3: This image provides Bob’s system. Inside the box there exist
optical components which are connected through fibre optic.
Bob’s system also comprises of optical and electronic components which are
dedicated to performing the measurements of the single photon. The optical
components assist in ensuring that the light pulses are transferred to Alice
and received back as single photons for measurement. As it can be seen in
Figure 4.3, the connections within the system are performed using the fibre.
The electronic component provides high-level operation in monitoring all the
devices in the system. The rest of the system will be discussed in section 4.4.
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4.3 Fibre optics
Figure 4.4: A schematic of a fibre optic cable [57].
A fibre is utilised to transmit information in the form of single photons from
point to point. The centre of the fibre is called the core which is surrounded
by a layer of cladding, and provides a path for light to travel. The difference
in refractive indices of the core and the cladding ensures that the light (single
photons) is contained within the core of the fibre [57]. Such a fibre cable is
illustrated in Figure 4.4.
Fibre optics are characterised by transmission wavelength and it varies from
800, 1310 and 1550 nm. Fibres with a wavelength around 800 nm have high
losses, due to the fact that they are employed for short distances. Due to
this, they are employed for short distances. Whereas optical fibres with a
wavelength of 1300 and 1550 nm provide a very low loss of about 35 dB and
20 dB respectively. Such fibres are utilised for long transmission distances
and are ideal for quantum signals.
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The disadvantage of fibre optics is its birefringence. The birefringence occurs
due to stress within the fibre as light propagating in the fast axis travels at
a higher group velocity and therefore splits between the polarisation which
can yield to dispersion [57]. The dispersion is the major effect that broadens
pulses hence causing them to overlap. This is one of the reasons polarisation
encodings is not the choice in fibre based QKD systems. Due to such chal-
lenges, fibres with 20 dB losses limit the transmission when the distance is
very long. The id 3000 system utilises 1550 nm wavelength as information
carriers which is called single-mode fibre. [58].
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4.4 Internal design of the id 3000 system
Figure 4.5: The internal schematic diagram of the id 3000 system. The
active components are shown: Laser Diode (LD), a Avalanche
Photo-counting Diodes (APD’s), Delay Line (DL), Phase Modulator (PM),
Variable Attenuator (VA), Classical Detector (CD) and Farraday Mirror
(FM) [56].
The following section offers a detailed overview of the internal structure of
the system focusing on the optical scheme. The optics operates with the
electronics interface in performing the key distribution process. Figure 4.5
shows the arrangement and connection of Bob’s system to Alice’s system,
connected through an optical fibre channel [56]. Each component of the
system is listed below starting from Bob’s system moving towards Alice’s
system.
4.4.1 Laser Diode (LD)
This laser diode (LD) is monochromatic in the sense that the light produced
has a single wavelength and is in phase [39]. The LD utilised in the id 3000
Laser generates light pulses in the range of 300 - 2500 ps. The schematic of
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Figure 4.6: The schematic diagram of an LD utilised in the id 3000 system
an LD is provided in Figure 4.6.
4.4.2 Circulator (C)
A circulator is a passive three or four port device in which light enters any
port, gets rotated and then transmitted. Normally, a three port device is
formed from a Y-junction in which the circulation flows as illustrated in
Figure 4.7, in a clockwise direction to perfectly guide light pulses [40]. In the
id 3000 system, this circulator is utilised to randomly direct the light pulses
through port 3 going towards the beam splitter.
Figure 4.7: The schematic of a circulator used in the id 3000 system [59].
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4.4.3 Avalanche Photo-Diode (APD)
Avalanche Photo-diode detectors (APD) detects information which has been
sent and produces signals. In the id 3000 system an APD detects returning
pulses and count the transmitted single photons including the noise. The
generation of fake signals is possible when APD’s are operated, in which an
APD generate a signal without Alice sending some pulses. The image of
APD is presented in section 3.1.3.
4.4.4 Beam Splitter (BS)
A Beam Splitter (BS) is an optical device used to split a laser beam into two
equal paths, transmission and reflection [60]. Figure 4.8 provides a diagram
of a beam splitter.
Figure 4.8: The schematic of a BS shows the 50 % of the light transmitted
and 50 % of the light reflected [35].
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4.4.5 Delay Line (DL)
A Delay Line (DL) is a device designed to enable a signal to be delayed
by a number of samples in order for an id 3000 system to obtain perfect
transmission. A DL comprises of an input and output to collect light into a
fibre. Figure 4.9 illustrate how the pulses can be delayed. These delay lines
are operated electronically.
5
Figure 4.9: The structure of a delay line demonstrating how pulses can be
delayed in the id 3000 system [61].
4.4.6 Phase Modulator (PM)
Phase modulation (PM) in the id 3000 system maintains the amplitude of
the single photon pulses and encodes bit values on the pulses. It is created
to perform a phase of every photon emitted to carry the information. The
illustration of this PM is provided in section 3.1.2
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4.4.7 Coupler 10:90 (10/90)
The coupler 10 : 90 is the fibre coupler which splits the light pulses into 10
% and 90 % intensity. Figure 4.10 provides the image of the coupler utilised
in the id 3000 system.
Figure 4.10: The schematic diagram of a fibre coupler 10:90 in the id 3000
system [62].
4.4.8 Classical Detector (CD)
Classical Detector (CD) is used to check for security as it prevents an eaves-
dropper from injecting light into the system. Since Eve can time-shift sin-
gle pulses that arrives at the phase modulator earlier or later by applying
phase-remapping attack. The classical detector monitors the incoming en-
ergy pulses in a sense that when Eve try to send the signal larger than the
threshold an alarm can trigger. For the id 3000 system, a CD operate at a
bias voltage of about 0 - 60 V. [63].
4.4.9 Variable Attenuator (VA)
A Variable Optical Attenuator (VA) is a device that lowers the intensity
of the light signal in an optical fibre. Figure 4.11 shows the schematic of
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a VA. VA is used mostly in fibre based communications to literally reduce
power level by calibrating the amount of signal loss or supplied such that the
transmitter and a receiver level is matched [64]. The id 3000 system provides
the variable attenuators (VA1 and VA2) to attenuate light pulses to single
photons, operating at a range of 1.5 - 20 dB.
Figure 4.11: The schematic of a variable attenuator used in the id 3000
system [65].
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4.4.10 Faraday Mirror (FM)
A Faraday Mirror (FM) is designed to reflect the light pulses. It is used in
the id 3000 system to ensure that the polarisation of light is maintained [59].
Figure 4.12 gives the schematic of a Faraday mirror.
Figure 4.12: An image of a passive mirror [59].
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4.5 Transmission in the id 3000 system
Bob sends strong pulses of light which pass through a circulator. In the cir-
culator, it then randomly chooses the port that goes through the first beam
splitter (BS1) and splits to 50/50 of transmission and reflection. Half trans-
mitted (50 %) light pulses travel through the short arm and the half reflected
(50 %) takes through the long arm. The short arm travels straight while the
long arm passes through the delay line, it then passes through the delay line
where pulses are delayed for some seconds to prevent noise. The propagation
continues to the PM which is inactive during the first pass. The light pulses
from the short and long arm thereafter recombine at BS2 and travel as one
pulse. This process is illustrated in Figure 4.5.
The light pulses travel via a channel fibre and reach Alice where the light
pulses separate at 10/90 fibre coupler. The intense (90 %) light pulses go
through the path toward VA1 and the weak (10 %) light pulses go through
the path towards VA2. The pulses get attenuated by VA1 and VA2 to single
photons in both paths. Single photons in the path VA1 are delayed for some
time in the delay line to prevent noise. The single photons in the path VA2
travel through a classical detector (CD), which monitors for the eavesdrop-
ping..
Two paths combine and pulses are reflected by the FM which is at the end
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point of Alice’s system. FM ensures that propagation and the polarisation of
light pulses in the fibre are maintained such that the light pulses are reflected
back to Bob. The propagation is reversible. The returning single photons
pass through the PM within Alice’s device, it is modulated and travels to
Bob to be detected by APD1 and APD2 to provide the raw key.
The effectiveness of the system during transmission is determined by the
bits measured by Bob known as the Raw Key length and the error rate
called Quantum Bit Error Rate. The Raw Key refers to the bits measured
by Bob from single photon pulses sent by Alice and is denoted as,
Rraw = qfµtabtbη, (4.1)
• q −→ is a factor that relies on the protocol implemented for example, in the
BB84 where most of the time 50 % of Alice and Bob’s bases do not match.
This factor is represented as 1
2
for the BB84 protocol.
• f −→ corresponds to a frequency of a signal pulse.
• µ −→ refers to the mean value of single photons in each pulse.
• tab −→ corresponds to transmission line from Alice to Bob.
• tb −→ refers to Bob’s transmission which normally around 0.6.
• η −→ refers to detection efficiency.
The Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER) refers to the errors obtained dur-
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ing the transmission. The QBER is an essential parameter in QKD systems
as it is applied to determine the security during the transmission and can
be expressed as a percentage. This parameter is defined as the ratio of the









where Wwrong corresponds to the errors obtained after the sifted key and is
denoted as Rerror. The Wwrong + Wright corresponds to the bits in the sifted
key is given as Rsifted. The QBER percentage varies according to the protocol
implemented during the transmission. The threshold QBER for the BB84
and SARG04 protocols is 11 % and 10.49 % respectively. When is it obtained
at a greater percentage than these, the id 3000 system produces a Raw Key




the id 3000 system
5.1 Method of controlling the system
The operation of the id 3000 system is based on the integration of hardware.
Its operating system is designed to work only with Microsoft Windows. The
program comprises of two applications packages namely, cryptomenu ap-
plication and Clavis application. These applications are prototyped to be
implemented through commands line of a C++ program.
5.1.1 Cryptomenu application
The cryptomenu application is available for both Alice and Bob after the
installation. Alice and Bob access cryptomenu via their respective computers
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which can be performed in parallel. The role of this particular property is
to allow the setting of the hardware parameters. For an optimal setting it is
advisable to access the initialisation file that is placed in the windows in the
file named cryptoini. The file enables the settings of all parameters. Once
the parameters are set, they can then be saved and viewed on the console
screen. The commands used to activate the parameters are given in the Table
5.1. The parameters initiated for Alice and Bob are displayed in Table 5.2
and 5.3.
Table 5.1: Commands used to activate the hardware parameters
Command Description of the command
X Open Log [cryptolog.txt]
Y Open Ini [cryptoini.ini ]
Z Save Ini [crptoini.ini]
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Table 5.2: Quantum Key Distribution parameters-Alice
Menu Setup Menu Setup
(A) Attenuator 1 [11 dB] (U) Attenuator 2 [0dB]
(B) Detector Bias [76] (T) Detector threshold 1 [5]
(D) Detector threshold [5] (E) PM State 1 [28.6% ] Z
(S) PM State 0 [0%] (M) PM State 3 [88.2% ]
(P) PM State 2 [57.3%] (R) PM Coarse delay [1201]
(O) Number of Frames [1680] (F) Phase adjustment
(N) Number of pulses [624]
Table 5.3: Quantum Key Distribution Parameters-Bob
Menu Setup Menu Setup
APD Bias 1 [33.35 V ] APD Bias 2 [ 32.9 V ]
(N) Number of laser pulses [624 ] (D) Number of detection pulses [ 624 ]
(D) Laser pulse width [ 500 ps] (M) PM Pulse width [ 2 ]
(S) PM State 1 [ 47.3% ] (C) Coarse Delay [ 0 ]
(P) Waiting Duration 1 [ 7466 ] (E) Fine Delay 2 [ 0 ]
(O) Number of Frames [1680] (I) Waiting duration 2 [ 1990 ]
A/B Phase modulator adjustment (T) Dead time [10 us ]
The APD can be set to the value presented in Table 5.3. A value below this
measurement can give an error when performing QKD. Some of the param-
eters take the same measurement in both Alice and Bob. This includes a
number of pulses and number of detection events. It is important that both
stations apply the same measurement for this purpose to achieve an optimal
key exchange. The laser pulse width can be set to a value of 500 ps. When
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it is set below this value, there is a high probability to obtain more errors
and noise during key exchange.
The detectors are operated to time delay settings namely a coarse delay
and a fine delay. The waiting period creates a delay between two or more
pulses. Period 2 is set to provide a temporary stop, constituting the end of
a frame and the start of the coming frame. The dead time is set to create a
delay between two runs of the experiment.
The phase modulator accesses interference of a single photon pulse when
Bob releases a train of pulses which Alice attenuates to single photons and
perform phase modulation on the individual single photon pulse. The counts
will then be recorded through the cryptomenu program at Bob’s system.
5.1.2 Clavis application
The main function of this property is to perform the entire process of quan-
tum key distribution. The application is designed to run on both computers.
The program running at Bob’s system acts as the master while Alice’s system
is a slave. Bob sends only the required information to Alice. This transfer is
managed via an Internet Protocol (IP). The IP address is accessed through
Bob’s computer. This connection will allow a transfer of data files to be
transferred from Bob to Alice. There exist two procedures which are as-
signed to run simultaneously. One monitors and memorizes all the supplied
information (key buffer), the other one performs encryption files. The tasks
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which are monitored in the memory include:
• The hardware check-up to check if the subsystems operating in the sys-
tem are functioning correctly. The subsystems that are monitored are the
temperature by checking the power that is supplied by Bob and Alice. The
hardware check includes verifying the amount of the emitted power for the
laser in Bob’s station and confirming the noise probability in the APD’s of
Bob’s system.
• The key buffer plays a role in the measurement of the optical link (line
length). The system synchronises the emitted pulses with their detection.
Bob then scans the delay during that emission and detection such that it
maximises the signal detection. The procedure runs repeatedly, for example,
seven to ten scans.
• When the system has achieved the above task it then performs a Raw
Key production which is done by exchanging single photon pulses. The sta-
tistical tests during the exchange are provided with the detection probability.
• The last task which takes place in the key buffer is the key distillation.
Key distillation is important for QKD. The key buffer distillates the Raw
Key bits which are stored in the computer’s memory to produce the crypto-
graphic key.
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5.2 Demonstration of the BB84 and SARG04
As a demonstration of QKD using the id 3000 system, students have a choice
of either implementing BB84 or SARG04 protocol in the id 3000 system.
Here we show a demonstration of both protocols. It should be noted that
the demonstration of these protocols is performed separately in the id 3000
system. It cannot be performed simultaneously. The id 3000 system provides
six steps for the accomplishment of QKD. These steps are applicable for
both protocols which can be demonstrated in the id 3000 system. Such steps
include checking the status, checking the noise, measuring the line length,
generating the files and obtaining the raw key.
5.2.1 Checking the status
Checking status is a mode in which the id 3000 system allows the user to
validate the temperature of the devices. This step was done in both the
systems of Alice and Bob. During the performance of QKD, the system’s
temperature and the voltage were displayed as shown in Tables 5.4 and 5.5.
This performance was obtained through the cryptomenu program of Alice’s
and Bob’s system via their correspondence computers. The results of this
step were performed using the first command on both computers. The first
command in the system reads as (status) in both systems.
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Table 5.4: Temperature at Alice
Read Temperature BB84 SARG04
TTL Power Supply [ 5V ] 4.97 V 4.96 V
ECL Power Supply [-5V ] - 4.9 V -4.8 V
Fans Power Supply [ 12V ] 11.92 V 11.92 V
TEC Current [ 0 - 3.5A ] -1.87 A -1.98 V
Device Temperature 250C 20.30c
Table 5.5: Temperature at Bob
Read Temperature (k) BB84 SARG04
TTL Power Supply [ 5V ] 4.99 V 4.98 V
ECL Power Supply [-5V ] - 4.46 V -4.51 V
Fans Power Supply [ 12V ] 11.92 V 11.94 V
TEC Current [ 0 - 3.5A ] 1.5 A 1.49 V
Device Temperature 25.9 0C 260C
Cooler Temperature 21.5 0C 20.70C
Error Temperature -0.1 % -0.15%
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5.2.2 Measuring the noise
The id 3000 system measures the noise in the system by measuring the dark
counts. Dark count is a term used for noise probability. This performance was
implemented using Bob’s computer through the cryptomenu program. When
performing this step, a second command was selected in the cryptomenu
application and is indicated as (noise measurement). After selecting this
command, the program will require a declaration of a dead time to be set by
the user for the second time in order for the system to provide the results of
this step. Shown in Tables 5.6 and 5.7, are the experimental results obtained
by Bob’s station while the cryptomenu program was running.
Table 5.6: This table present the noise detected during the implementation
of the BB84 in the id 3000 system
BB84 Detector 1 Detector 2
Number of detection 290 115
Statistical error 5.66 % 8.11%
Noise Probability 2.9× 10−4 1,5×10−4
Total number of gates on both detectors (976927)
As observed from Tables 5.6 and 5.7, the actual noise measurement was
considered as a noise probability. The statistical error percentage observed
in both protocols indicates high noise in the id 3000 system. The noise is
equivalent to losses which are likely to reduce the raw key.
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Table 5.7: This table present the noise detected during the implementation
of the SARG04 in the id 3000 system
SARG04 Detector 1 Detector 2
Number of detection 308 134
Statistical error 5.77 % 8.64%
Noise Probability 3.1× 10−4 1.3×10−4
Total number of gates on both detectors (978326)
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5.2.3 Checking the line length
Line length, also called optical link, is when the user can approximately
measure the length for the key exchange. This step is performed by Bob only
via his computer through the cryptomenu program. The principle behind this
step is that: a number of pulses are emitted from Bob’s system to Alice’s
system and get reflected back to Bob to be measured. It is a transmission
that opens a number a detection in Bob. The phase modulator at Bob’s
system was set in order to guide the single photons along the two APD’s
equally. The detection occurs via three line passes. Using the command 3
named (line length measurement), Bob’s station scans and locates only the
maximum detection. Tables 5.8 and 5.9 below provides the results obtained
when running this step in the id 3000 system. From the length of 12 km that
was set Bob’s system performed gated detection and maximum detection was
located as an optical link and was observed as 11.394 km and 11.794 km for
BB84 and SARG respectively.
Table 5.8: Line Length detection for 12 km performed through the id 3000
system focusing on the BB84 protocol
Passes Detector 1 Detector 2
Line pass 1 6.2 % 5.4 %
Line pass 2 0.1 % 0.1 %
Line pass 3 0.1 % 0.8 %
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Table 5.9: Line Length detection for 12 km performed through the id 3000
system based in the SARG04 protocol
Passes Detector 1 Detector 2
Line pass 1 4.5 % 5.6 %
Line pass 2 0.1 % 0 %
Line pass 3 0.1 % 0.8 %
For this performance, the id 3000 system is designed to produce a detection
not above 10% for optimal results. A very low detection percentage, in this
case, is considered as good results.
5.2.4 Generating files for key exchange
Figure 5.1: The schematic diagram demonstrating the process of the key
exchange within Alice and Bob’s system. The QKDS-A is referred to
Alice’s system and QKDS-B referred to Bob’s system.
Generating files is when Alice starts the key exchange process. This step
was performed after the line length was measured. Alice’s system via her
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computer using cryptomenu program prepared 14 Mbits by applying the
second command in the cryptomenu program. The command is named (gen-
erate random file). The system then generated files such as a data providing
pseudo random numbers. The Alice data file was sent to Bob as illustrated
in Figure5.1. When Bob receives the file, he then starts the measurement.
Bob first downloads Alice’s data file and Bob’s data file to perform a Raw
Key exchange. A Raw Key file will then be produced. In the end, Bob has
three files of data as seen in Figure 5.1. They are indicated as Alice.data,
Bob.data and Raw data. This step demonstrates how the transmission was
performed between the two users.
5.2.5 Obtaining the actual Raw Key
This step provides the Raw Key obtained by Bob. Hence, it is the last stage
for our demonstration of QKD. This step was performed by Bob through
cryptomenu. Here, the system provides the actual measurement during the
key exchange. The data obtained for this step was obtained using the sixth
command provided as (sifting) in the cryptomenu Bob’s computer. Results
are presented in Tables 5.10 and 5.11. From Tables 5.10 and 5.11, the id 3000
system presented a total amount of the sent bit as 14629440 and 14358280
respective for BB84 and SARG04.
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Table 5.10: Dataset containing the bits sent and Raw key when BB84 was

















From the bits Alice had prepared and sent, a total number of 338280 for
BB84 and 358280 for SARG04 bits were detected. From the detection gates
performed by Bob during BB84 implementation, detector 1 and 2 manage to
detect 10188 and 21630 respectively. In the SARG04 a number of 12188 and
27630 detections were observed respectively in the detector 1 and 2. Finally,
the Raw Key in the BB84 and SARG04 protocol were produced to be 17310
bit/s and 20120 bit/s respectively. A 3.017 % error rate known as a QBER
was obtained from the system when BB84 was implemented. When SARG04
was realised 2.332 % error rate was observed.
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5.2.6 Comparison of BB84 and SARG04
From the demonstration of BB84 and SARG04 in the id 3000 system, the
main parameters we checked are the Raw Key and QBER. Comparing the
outcomes of these two parameters (Table 5.10 and 5.11) during the imple-
mentation of the aforementioned protocols, the SARG04 performed better
than the BB84 protocol.
When comparing the results acquired during the implementation of the BB84
and SARG04 protocols. We obtained a raw key of 17310 bit/s from 14629440
bit/s sent when BB84 was demonstrated and 20120 bit/s was obtained from
14629440 bit/s prepared during the implementation of SARG04. From this
data the QBER is measured. The threshold QBER for the BB84 and SARG04
protocols is 11 % and 10.49 % respectively. This is the maximum limit of the
QBER that infers whether a transmitted key is discarded or kept for further
post-processing. We obtained 3.017 % during the implementation of BB84
and 2.332 % for the SARG04 protocol. This was achieved even though there
was a high presence of noise in the id 3000 system. The SARG04 proto-
col has the advantage to provide efficient results in presence of noise. This
was observed during the implementation, as indicated in Table 5.11, where a




We have successfully demonstrated how to introduce QKD into the under-
graduate physics curriculum. We have outlined steps which make it more
convenient for undergraduate students to understand the relevant processes.
We have further performed a typical experiment using the QKD system id
3000. The system we utilised will be available in the physics 3rd year labora-
tory at the University of KwaZulu-Natal and can be exploited by the students
as a learning tool. The experiment can be performed in a typical three hours
lab session. This will improve their understanding regarding this application.
QKD technology has a real world implementation and numerous groups have
implemented QKD. For example, the University of KwaZulu Natal performed
the practical real world QKD over distances 13.08 km at Cato Manor in Dur-
ban between Central Application Office and Ethekwini Municipality original
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Offices buildings in 2008 [66]. The id 3000 system was employed for this
realisation. This was further implemented for the Quantum Stadium Project
during the 2010 Fifa World Cup with an upgraded version of the id 3000
system [67].
The real world implementation of this technology encourages students to
explore quantum mechanics in more depth. Our demonstration for under-
graduate students was carried out in the lab environment. Using the id 3000
system with a 12 km fibre inside the system a secure key was exchanged
between Alice and Bob over a distance of 12 km. We demonstrated QKD
focusing on the BB84 and SARG04 protocol. The system is designed to be
implemented through fibre optic with a 1550 nm wavelength which then acts
as a link (quantum channel).
The id 3000 system was set up to perform the key distribution process which
was controlled via a computer for Alice and Bob. The setting of the hard-
ware parameters was done using the cryptomenu application. The Clavis
application accessed the transfer of data files between the two users, where
the transfer was accessed through Internet Protocol.
QKD was demonstrated by following the steps offered in crypomenu ap-
plication. The first step was employed for the validation of the temperature
of the system and the system measured at 47.7 0C. The second step was per-
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formed to measure noise in the system, the detectors detected dark counts
which read as noise probability of 2.9 × 10−4 in detector 1 and 1.5 × 10−4
in detector 2 for the BB84. When SARG04 was implemented dark counts
(noise probability) for D1 was 3.1 × 10−4 and 1.3 × 10−4 in D2. The third
step was employed for the demonstration of the line length in which the users
can exchange the key. A length of 12 km was set and measured, where Bob’s
system performed gated detection and maximum detection was located as
an optical link and was observed as 11.394 km and 11.794 km for BB84 and
SARG protocol respectively.
The fourth step was demonstrated after the length had been measured and
was performed by Alice’s system. Alice sent 14 Mbits to Bob to be mea-
sured. Bob received a file containing pseudo random numbers. The last step
resulted in the generation of the Raw Key and QBER. From the demonstra-
tion of the BB84 and SARG04 protocol, a Raw Key rate of 17310 bits/s
and 20120 bits/s respectively were measured by Bob. A QBER of 3.017 %
from BB84 and 2.332 % in the SARG04 was obtained with the id 3000 system.
The demonstration of QKD in both protocols was successful in the id 3000
system. All the information presented in chapter 5 including the results pro-
vided in the Tables are the proof that QKD was successfully implemented
using id 3000 system and the system was efficient.
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